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Recent Case
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

EQUAL PROTECTION -

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX IN THE PROVISION OF
ARMED SERVICES DEPENDENTS' BENEFITS
Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
For almost a century the Supreme Court consistently upheld legislation the purpose and effect of which were to treat women differently from men.- In 1971, the Court for the first time decided
otherwise, when it held that a statute the effect of which was to disadvantage women in the selection of the administrator of an estate
was unconstitutional. 2 Recently, in Frontierov. Richardson3 it again
invalidated legislation based on classification by sex by holding that
statutes treating male and female members of the uniformed services 4 differently for purposes of determining housing allowances
and medical and dental benefits violate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. A plurality of four justices in the 8-to-1 decision went so far as to hold that sex is a suspect classification and
that statutes distinguishing between the sexes must be subjected to
strict scrutiny. 5
Appellant Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States
Air Force, sought to claim her husband as her "dependent" in order
to obtain an increased allowance for quarters6 and medical and dental care benefits. 7 Her request was denied, for under the applicable
statutes,8 female members of the uniformed services were required
to show that their spouses were in fact dependent upon them for
over one-half of their support - a standard which the appellant
IBradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 130 (1872). See text accompanying
note 63 infra. See generally Brown, Emerson, Folk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Sexual Equality, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Brown]; Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do
We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971).
2 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
3 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
4 The "uniformed services" include the armed forces, the Environmental Science
Services Administration, and the Public Health Service. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(1) (1970);
37 U.S.C. § 101(3) (1970).
5 411 U.S. at 682.
6 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
7 10 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970).
8 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (c) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
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could not satisfy.Y The spouse of a male member, on the other
hand, was automatically presumed to be a "dependent" under the
statute. Lt. Frontiero and her husband challenged the denial before
a three-judge district court on the ground that this statutory difference in treatment constituted an unconstitutional discrimination
against servicewomen in violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.' 0
The district court rejected their claim," but the Supreme Court
reversed in an 8-to-1 decision without a majority opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four, 12 upheld the appellants'
contention "that classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect
and must therefore be subjected to dose judicial scrutiny."' 3 He
likened sex to race and national origin in that it is a characteristic
over which the individual has no control and which "frequently
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."'14
He found at least implicit support for this decision in Reed v.
Reed,"3 which held that a sex-based classification, the only purpose
of which was to accomplish administrative convenience, was arbitrary and therefore violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.' 6 In addition, Justice Brennan pointed to
Congress' recent passage and submission to the states of the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA)' 7 as an indication that Congress itself
recognized the invidious nature of sex discrimination. In applying
the strict standard of judicial review, mandated by his finding that
sex was a suspect classification,' 8 Justice Brennan concluded that the
government's purpose of achieving administrative convenience did
not justify the differential treatment afforded male and female mem9 411 U.S. at 680 n.4.

Id. at 679.
11 Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The district court's
opinion is discussed in notes 30-32 infra.
1 Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall.
13 411 U.S. at 682 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the Court's treatment
of other suspect classifications, see note 33 infra.
14 Id. at 686 (footnotes omitted).
15404 U.S. 71 (1971). See text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
16 404 U.S. at 76-77.
17 S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 4612 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1972); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC 9392 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 1971). For text of the proposed amendment, see note 78 infra.
18
The issue of whether classification by sex is suspect is discussed further at notes
46-59 infra and accompanying text.
10
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bers of the military and that the statutes therefore violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.' 9
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. He relied on Reed as controlling, but he did not interpret that case, as the plurality did, as
implicitly recognizing sex as a suspect classification. Rather, he
found that it was unnecessary to designate sex as a suspect classification 20 and inappropriate to do so, since the Equal Rights Amendment was then pending before many state legislatures.
Mr. Justice Stewart voiced his separate concurring opinion in
a terse and ambiguous statement: "[T]he statutes before us work
an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Reed
v. Reed ....
21
Finally, Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented "for the reasons stated
by Judge Rives in his opinion for the District Court. ' 22 The district
court had held that if the statutes are read as creating classifications
by sex,2 3 they are valid because they have a rational basis. It decided that (1) it was reasonable to assume that men usually are
the breadwinners for their families, and (2) if in some cases men
without actual dependents received windfall benefits, servicewomen
were not in any way deprived.
While Frontiero evinces no clear majority holding on the constitutionality of sex discrimination, the case is notable in two respects.
First, though three of the four opinions rely on the same case as
precedent, Frontiero contains the whole range of analytical approaches used by the Court in equal protection cases.24 Second,
'9 411 U.S. at 688-91.
2
0 Id. at 691-92.
21 Id. at 691.
22
Id., citing Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
23 The district court dealt with the constitutionality of classification by sex only
in the alternative. Its primary reasoning was that the statutory scheme did not discriminate on the basis of sex. Under the scheme, the availability of the conclusive
presumption of dependency was a function of two factors: the sex of the servicemember
and the relationship between the servicemember and the purported dependent. For
some relationships, the result did not vary with the sex of the servicemember. To
establish the dependency of an adult child, for example, a showing of dependency
in fact was required regardless of whether the servicemember was male or female.
Since the classifications were not drawn exclusively on the basis of sex, the district
court believed they were constitutionally permissible. 341 F. Supp. at 205-06.
24 Since the fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, the
Supreme Court has said that Congress is not subject to the same limitations against
discriminatory action as are the states. Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S.

463, 4(8 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937).

Yet, the Court has found
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while Frontiero may not be an emphatic grant of increased constitutional protection to women, it shows an evolving concern for equality of the sexes.
Traditionally the Court has used two approaches to reviewing
challenges to legislative classifications.2 1 Where legislation involves
mere economic or social interests, as opposed to a fundamental right,
and does not create a suspect classification, 6 all that is required is
that the classification be reasonable and bear some conceivable rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose.2 ' There is a presumption in favor of the validity of the legislation, and the party
attacking the classification bears the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any rational basis.2 8 The classification need not be
perfect; the legislature may adopt a scheme that attacks only one
aspect of a larger problem. So long as the judgments underlying
the classification rest on some rational basis, the statute will be upheld.29
The district court's opinion, which Justice Rehnquist adopts in
his dissent, is an example of this approach. The district court found
a conceivable rational basis in the possible administrative and economic convenience which a scheme of different legislative treatment
for men and women might afford the government. 30 The court
noted that "legislation may impose special burdens upon defined
classes to achieve permissible ends."'" Under the district court's reasoning, however, there was no need to reach this conclusion. It
did not consider it to be a burden to servicewomen to be denied
that some discrimination is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process" under
the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331-32 (1921). Although the Court has indicated that
discrimination must be more unjustifiable to violate the fifth amendment than the
fourteenth, no cases exist that illustrate the difference. Some cases have had the
same result under both amendments. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), with Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). Since all three concurring opinions in Frontiero rely on Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1972), a case based on the fourteenth amendment, the Court
may believe that in some situations, at least, the difference is negligible. See also
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
25
See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2
6 See note 33 in!ra.
27
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464,466 (1948).
28
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
29
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972), citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
30 341 F. Supp. at 208.
31Id. at 207, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (dictum).
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the windfall benefits received by those servicemen whose wives were
not in fact dependent.3 2
Because the district court found neither a suspect classification33
nor an infringement of a fundamental right,34 it had no need to
subject the legislation to strict judicial scrutiny. But had the challenged legislation involved either of these elements, the statute
would not have been presumed valid. Rather, the burden would
have been on the state to show that an actual compelling governmental interest 35 was promoted by the classification and that there
was no less onerous means of advancing that interest.36 This burden is not light: "And when we enter the realm of 'strict judicial
scrutiny,' there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience'
is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality. '37 Thus, when Justice Brennan declared sex a suspect
classification, that decision mandated strict judicial scrutiny of the
legislation, a test so stringent that, when it applies, an outcome
adverse to the statute is usually assured. 8
32 341 F. Supp. at 207.
33 At the time Frontiero was decided, the Court had held only race, lineage, and

alienage to be inherently suspect classifications. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973) (alienage); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (alienage); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323;
U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin). Classifications based on wealth or indigency have
been treated as suspect only when they have been tied to a denial of important
rights provided by the state. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (right to vote in state election). There is also some indication that
illegitimacy or bastardy is being treated as a suspect classification by the Court. Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 107-09 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting, discussing Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), as an example of the Court's sensitivity to
classifications based on legitimacy).
34 Fundamental rights are those expressly and impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973);
see, e.g., id. at 35-37 (no fundamental right to education); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to travel interstate); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental right to procreate).
35 "The state interest required has been characterized as 'overriding,' [McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)] . . . ; 'compelling,' Graham v. Richardson,
[405 U.S. 365, 375 (1971)1; 'important,' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343
(1972), or 'substantial,' ibid. We attribute no particular significance to these variations in diction." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973).
36 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969); for discussion see San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). See
generally Developments, supra note 25, at 1076-87.
37 411 U.S. at 690.
38 In some cases, though, a compelling governmental interest has been found, and
the statute has therefore survived the strict judicial scrutiny test. E.g., Roe v. Wade,
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Prior to Frontiero, through the use of an intermediate approach
to equal protection analysis, the Court in Reed was able to find
the use of a sex-based classification to be a denial of equal protection without going so far as categorizing sex as suspect.3 9 Using
this intermediate approach, which is of more recent origin than the
rational basis and compelling interest approaches, the Court does
not settle for any conceivable rational basis. Rather, it critically
examines the rationales proferred by the proponent of the statute.
As in strict judicial scrutiny, the burden is on the proponents of
the legislation, but they must show only a bona fide rational basis,
not a compelling interest.
At issue in Reed was an Idaho statute requiring that, where
candidates for estate administration are of equal relationship to the
decedent, males are to be preferred to females. Using the intermediate approach, later labelled a "departure from 'traditional' rational
basis analysis, ' 40 the Court acknowledged that the statute had two
rational bases: administrative convenience in avoiding a hearing on
the merits and avoidance of intrafamily controversy. 41 Yet the
Court found neither rationale strong enough to overcome the challenge to the use of a sex-based classification. 2 Since either of these
410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (fundamental right of privacy); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-34 (1959) (fundamental first amendment rights); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (suspect classification of national origin). See
note 106 infra.
3
9See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
40 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
A prototype of this intermediate review technique is found in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court held that a Massachusetts statute permitting married
persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy but prohibiting distribution
to unmarried persons for that same purpose violates the equal protection clause. The
Court systematically examined the bases offered by the state in support of the statute,
(1) deterrence of premarital sex, and (2) protection of public health through the
regulation of potentially harmful drugs, and concluded that they "[could) not reasonably be regarded as legislative aims" of the statute. Id. at 443. The Court further
concluded that, viewed as a prohibition of contraception per se, the statute violated
the rights of single persons under the fourteenth amendment. The Court's opinion
in Reed is less methodical than in Eisenstadt. In Eisenstadt the Court rebutted the
reasonableness of the state's case point by point, while in Reed it merely found the
reasons were not strong enough to support the legislation.
41404 U.S. at 76-77.
42 In cases like Reed, two distinct classes of state interests must be distinguished
in assessing the rationales advanced in support of the statutory classification. The
two state interests in the first class considered by the Supreme Court in Reed were
avoiding intrafamily controversy and expediting probate proceedings by eliminating
the need for hearings. These, balanced with an insignificant personal interest in
acting as an estate administrator, both support the drawing of any classification, so
long as the classifying factor is easily identifiable. But they no more support the
drawing of a sex-based classification than they do a classification scheme based, for
example, on whether a person is blue- or brown-eyed. It seems, therefore, that before
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rationales would appear to constitute a "rational basis" in the traditional sense of the phrase, the Court's rejection of both rationales
as sufficient bases for sustaining the statute indicates that it was
adopting a stricter test.43 Apparently the interest of an individual
in administering an estate and the nature of the classification were
deemed on balance to outweigh the state's interest in the legislation.44 The Court did not find sex to be a suspect classification.
a discriminatory statute such as the one in Reed can be upheld on the ground that
the easy applicability of its classification scheme affords administrative convenience,
a second class of state interests must also be found to support it, a class of interests
that provides a rational basis for selecting the particular classification scheme adopted.
The operation of these two classes of interests can be illustrated by examining the
Supreme Court of Idaho's opinion in Reed, which upheld the state statute. Reed
v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970). After concluding that the legislature's
probable purpose was the legitimate one of expediting the prompt administration
of estates, the Idaho court stated that the classification scheme was permissible because
the legislature might justifiably assume that men are in general better qualified to
act as administrators than are women. Id. at 514, 465 P.2d at 638. Once this conclusion on the relative qualifications of males and females is accepted and coupled with
the state's legitimate interest in securing the most competent administration for estates,
a rational basis for selecting the male-female scheme can be found. See The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARy. L. REV. 55, 118-19 n.16 (1973). This is not to
say that only this second type of interest may be considered in examining whether
the state's interests outweigh the discriminatory effects of the statute. For this calculation, the entire aggregate of state interests furthered by the statutory scheme, as
well as the individual interests at stake, may be included in the balance.
43 For a discussion of the Court's shift from its traditional two-level standard
of judicial review of equal protection cases to an intermediate approach, see Gunther, Supreme Court 1971 Term: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-20 (1972).
See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This intermediate approach has been employed
in cases affecting what the Court has called "personal rights." See Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). "Personal rights" tend to fall somewhere
between fundamental rights, which receive strong judicial protection through a strict
standard of judicial review, and economic rights, which receive the least in the way
of judicial protection. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court recognizes that personal rights are a gradient above economic rights: "It is plain that
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacing
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. " Id. at 651. See generally Note, Personal Rights as an Emerging Approach
to Equal Protection, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 163 (1972). These "personal rights"
cases have involved legislative classifications providing for the different treatment of
married and unmarried persons in the sale or distribution of contraceptives, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); of married and unmarried fathers in guardianship
proceedings, Stanley v. Illinois, supra; of legitimate and illegitimate children in wrongful death proceedings, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra; and of length of
residency in a state in determining status at state universities, Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973).
44 Prior to Reed the Court had explained that "trio decide whether a law violates
the Equal Protection Clause, [it looks], in essence, to three things: the character of
the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and
the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). See also note 90 infra.

19731

SEX DISCRIMINATION

But in view of the questionable importance of the right to administer
an estate, the Court's refusal to uphold the statute indicates that
it must have been somewhat disturbed by the classification.4 5
Although Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Frontiero does
not go through the mechanics of the active-review approach, its
reliance on Reed indicates an adoption of active review. The rationale, as in Reed, was that administrative convenience did not justify the distinctions by sex contained in the statute which involved
an interest less significant than a fundamental right.
In sum, one or more members of the Court relied on each of
the three approaches available to it, and good arguments can be
made for the appropriateness of each. The statutes in Frontiero
appeared to involve merely an economic interest, and since the
Court had never explicitly held that strict review was warranted
for classification by sex, the rational-basis test could have sufficed.
The approach of the concurring opinion likewise is tenable, in that
Reed, which involved a relatively insubstantial right, was nonetheless precedent for active review in the case of statutory classification
by sex.
Gunther, supra note 43, at 34.
[Tihe apparent conformity of the Reed opinion to the model is thrown
into doubt by the holding that the sex criterion was "arbitrary." It is difficult to understand that result without an assumption that some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis. Clear priority
classifications are plainly relevant to the State's interest in reducing administrative disputes.... Only by importing some special suspicion of sex-related
means from the [suspect classification] area can the result be made entirely
persuasive.
Id. (foonotes omitted). An alternative explanation for the Court's decision in Reed
might be derived from the analysis set forth in note 42 supra. Professor Gunther's
reasoning appears to be that since the state's interest in simplifying probate proceedings
is a legitimate one and the statutory scheme furthered that interest, the Court's result
cannot be supported by a pure means-oriented, minimum-rationality test Id. at 3334. But as has been discussed, in the "administrative convenience" cases, the rationality of the particular classification drawn must be tested independently. Note 42 supra.
Were the rational-relationship test to require only the furtherance of the state's
legitimate interest in procedural convenience, even the hypothetical blue-eyed-browneyed scheme might be constitutionally permissible. Thus, there must be a second
part to the test And perhaps it was under this part that the Idaho statute considered
in Reed failed. Chief Justice Burger might well have concluded, contrary to the
Idaho court, that there was no support for the assumption that men were better
qualified to administer estates than women. If this was the basis for his decision
in Reed, it would account for his use of the phrase "arbitrajy legislative choice"
(404 U.S. at 76), which troubled Professor Gunther. Moreover, if the outcome in
Reed turned on Burger's conclusion as to the arbitrariness of this particular classification scheme, then it is conceivable, at least prior to Frontiero, that some sex-based
discriminations for purposes of administrative convenience may be upheld, so long
as there is some concrete basis for drawing the classification along sexual lines. This
issue is discussed further in note 94 infra.
45
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The compelling-interest test, applied by the plurality on the
ground that sex is a suspect classification, is also arguably appropriate, although the Court has never before treated sex discrimination
in suspect-classification terms. To date, no precise set of criteria
have been articulated for determining what constitutes a suspect
classification, 46 and the plurality reached its decision principally by
concluding that sex shared certain fundamental characteristics with
other classifications previously recognized as suspect: race, alienage,
and national origin. 47 Three separate factors were relied upon by
the plurality: First, sex, even more than race, is a highly visible
and distinctive characteristic. Presumably, the plurality was concerned that because of this identifiability legislators could easily use
sex as a classifying criterion to embody unwarranted stereotypical
notions 48 and the prospect of effective informal discrimination is
great. Second, sex is immutable and congenital. And third, it typically bears no rational relation to an individual's ability to perform.
The plurality appears to regard the coexistence of the latter two
elements as particularly invidious; 49 the combination produces a
class of people who, from birth, are automatically relegated to a
lifetime inferior status, a status which bears no logical connection
to their propensities or capabilities. Finally, the plurality drew support for its decision from statutes demonstrating what it viewed as
an increased sensitivity on the part of Congress to sex-based classification. 50
Two distinct dimensions appear to underlie the plurality's articulated views concerning the composition of the area where traditional
rational basis protection is no longer adequate, and a suspect-classification label must therefore be imposed. The first, and more obvious, dimension is the idea that the classification must be typically
arbitrary; that is, a resort to the classification in almost any context
will characteristically lack a rational relationship to a permissible
legislative goal. But before the suspect-classification doctrine is triggered, some other factor must be present. If the problem is merely
46

Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1507 (1971).
47 411 U.S. at 686-87.
48
Note, supra note 46, at 1507.
49 The California Supreme Court, in holding that sex was a suspect dassification
under the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions, had also given
strong weight to these two factors. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17-20, 485
P.2d 529, 539-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-41 (1971).
50 This argument loses much of its persuasiveness in view of the fact that it
was Congress that had enacted the discriminatory statute under review.
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that the scheme is typically irrational, then traditional equal protection analysis or the intermediate approach of Reed will be sufficient
to correct abuses without imposing upon the state the requirement
that it show a compelling interest to uphold the statute in those
cases where it is justified in employing the scheme.
The additional dimension that is apparently necessary focuses
upon the severity of the consequences of the discriminatory scheme.
Several factors might be relevant to this determination: the ease
and the frequency with which the classification is implemented,
whether the statute perpetuates a significant differential in the welfare of the two classes, and any other characteristics which would
establish that it is overly burdensome to require the class member
continually to litigate whether the classification, in each new implementation, possesses a rational basis. Furthermore, from the
Frontiero plurality's emphasis upon characteristics that are immutable and arise by accident of birth, there is an indication that where
traits over which an individual has no control are used to produce
an unnecessary impact upon his fate, notions of equality of opportunity might lead the Court to declare that the troublesome classifications, even though they might have a rational basis in some instances, are nonetheless suspect. 51
One other consideration useful in assessing severity, not treated
by the Frontiero plurality but viewed by some commentators as the
acid test of a suspect classification, 52 is whether the classification has
some stigmatizing effect upon the circumscribed class. If this requirement of stigma is read restrictively to mean a "badge of opprobrium," as some have suggested, 53 perhaps classification by sex is not
sufficiently troublesome; sex does not present the potential for social
scorn attendant to race or illegitimacy, for example. If, on the
other hand, the appropriate inquiry under this test is whether the
classifying scheme is one that reflects beliefs regarding the relative
inferiority or unfitness of the class, then sex may be covered. And
this latter approach appears the more logical. The line of analysis
thus far has been: given a classification which in its more typical
51See Developments, supra note 25, at 1127, where the authors state that similar
considerations may explain why classifications based upon race have received more
restrictive treatment than those based upon poverty or alienage, factors over which

the person exercises some control.
52

E.g., id. See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 20

(1969).
53See

Development, supra note 25, at 1127.
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implementation is arbitrary, what additional quantum of harmfulness is necessary before the Court requires the state to support its
position by a compelling interest? The troublesome areas would
seem to be those where the statutory scheme parallels harbored notions that there is a natural difference in the abilities, worth, and
interest of the two groups. 54 Where this occurs, there is a particular danger that unfounded stereotypes rather than legislative necessities were the guiding force behind the statutory scheme, and, because the statute makes express recognition of the distinctions in
the capabilities of the two groups, it tends to perpetuate already
rooted prejudices. It is in these situations that the pervasive prohibition afforded by imposition of the suspect-classification label is
necessary in order to counteract the effects of the abusive stereotypes
that are at the heart of the classification scheme.
Under this latter view of the stigma requirement, a strong case
can be made that classification by sex is suspect. The problems
inherent in employing sex as a classifying factor are more closely
akin to those involved with using race than those with poverty or
illegitimacy; at close scrutiny, the beliefs underlying the statutory
distinction in Reed, as phrased by the Idaho court,55 are suspiciously
similar to the kind of thinking that denied women the right to vote
or restricted the rights of married women to hold property or make
contracts.5 6
The principal difficulties in subjecting sex to suspect classification treatment, though, are not those encountered in applying the
stigma requirement; rather, they arise under the other dimension
of the Court's concern: inherent arbitrariness. Unlike race and
other traditionally suspicious classifications, sex, because of physical
differences such as strength and childbearing capacity,57 can present
the state with valid reasons for differentiating. And it might be
difficult to fit distinctions this fundamental into the narrow compelling-state-interest doctrine. 8 But, insomuch as classification by sex
presents the same potential for abuse that has led the Court to de54

Cf. Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw.

U.L. REV. 481,496 (1971).
55
See note 42 supra.
5
6See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 19 & nn.17-20, 485 P.2d 529,
540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340-41 (1971).
57 See Comment, supra note 54, at 497.
58
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224-25 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring; classification permissible as exercise of the presidential and congressional
war powers).
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clare other classifications suspect, reasonable bounds could be fashioned to contain the states' use of the physical-differences rationale, 59
and any sex discriminations falling outside these bounds could be
analyzed under classic suspect-classification reasoning.
The plurality's opinion in Frontiero demonstrates that members
of the Court are coming to believe that a special potential for harm
inheres in sex-based classification. To decide in favor of the Frontieros, it was not necessary for the plurality to hold that all sexbased classifications are constitutionally suspect under the fifth
amendment. Moreover, its decision to that effect significantly expands the treatment that any member of the Court has been willing
to accord such classifications. As authority for this decision the plurality relied heavily on Reed and stated that Reed gave "at least
implicit support" for finding sex a suspect category. 60 But in view
of the fact that the government conceded in Frontiero that administrative convenience was the sole purpose behind Congress' differential treatment of men and women,"' Frontiero appears to present
the same issue as Reed. A significant question, then, is why the
plurality went beyond Reed, which did not reach the suspect-classification issue. 2
The answer appears to be that the case involved a classification
of increasing importance. Tracing the cases that have reviewed legislation directed at women shows a change in the Court's posture
toward women's status. Although not all of the early cases presented equal protection issues, the same rationale is pervasive in all
the opinions. 63 In 1872 in Bradwell v. IllinoiS, a married woman
59

0One such endeavor has already been made in the context of the Equal Rights

Amendment. Brown, supra note 1.
60 411 U.S. at 682.
61 Id. at 688.
62 In fact, comparing the persuasiveness of the administrative convenience arguments in the two cases, Frontiero might have been an easier case than Reed. If
the treatment of servicemen and servicewomen were equalized by requiring that both
sexes prove dependency in fact, it is likely that the funds saved by denying benefits
to servicemen who failed to make the necessary showing would greatly exceed the
cost of conducting the additional hearings. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term,
supra note 42, at 122 '& nn.37-39. Neither of the parties submitted figures on
the actual costs involved. As something of a concession, however, the government
in its brief quoted from a statement made by the Department of Defense in response
to proposed amendments to the statutes at issue in Frontiero: "In view of the limited
number of female personnel in the military service, the proposed legislation [to equalize treatment of military personnel by dropping the factual dependency test for servicewomenJ would not have a major impact on the Department of Defense." S.
REP. No. 1218, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), quoted in Brief for Appellee at
13.
63 Brown, suora note 1, at 875-76.
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was denied a license to practice law because the Supreme Court
of Illinois believed that the legislature could not have intended that
the license be conferred on classes of persons who had never been
licensed under the common law, and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed because a professional license was not a privilege
or immunity of citizenship. The concurring opinion of Justice Bradley in that case provided the philosophical basis for later decisions
that upheld legislation segregating the sexes. Justice Bradley, in
his concurring opinion, wrote: "[TIhe civil law as well as nature
herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman."6 5 His language of separateness and uniqueness was used again in Muller v. Oregon,66
which sustained maximum hour legislation for women when only
3 years earlier in Lochner v. New York 67 the Court had found such
legislation, as applied to male bakery workers, to be an unconstitutional impairment of freedom of contract. In order to resolve what
appeared to be an inconsistency in its earlier reasoning, the Muller
Court relied on the unique position of women in society as a basis
68
for distinguishing Lochner without overruling it.
This "sharp line between the sexes"6 was perpetuated as the
rationale behind the Court's rejecting a claim of sex discrimination
under the equal protection clause almost 40 years later. In Goesaert v. Cleary7 a Michigan statute, which prohibited the granting
of a bartending license to any woman but the wife or daughter of
a male bar owner, was challenged. Using traditional rational-basis
04 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

65 Justice Bradley's opinion continues:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....
It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded
on the nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence....
[I]n my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny and mission
of women, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices,
positions, and callings Ehall be filed and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, and that decision and
firmness which are presumed to predominate on the sterner sex.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141-42. Parts of this passage are cited by the plurality in Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85.
66 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
67 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
68 208 U.S. at 422-23.
69 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
70

Id.
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analysis, the Court was satisfied with finding a conceivable rational
basis for the prohibition and upheld the legislation. The possibility
that such legislation was designed to protect the health, morals, and
safety of women was adequate to sustain the legislation despite the
effect of virtually monopolizing the trade for men. The same protective attitude flourished into the 1960's with the Court's decision
in Hoyt v. Florida,71 which upheld a Florida statite excluding women from jury service unless they voluntarily applied. The Court's
view of women as the center of home and family life made it possible for it to find a rational basis in the state's interest in preserving
72
the general welfare by not requiring women to leave the home.
Reed was a departure from this line of cases. In contrast to them,
the Court's emphasis in Reed was on the similar situation of men
and women,7 3 and the Court refused to supply the conceivable reasons why the statute should be upheld. Reed provided the first
indication that the Supreme Court was discarding its traditional
"protectionist" philosophy toward women; by the time Frontierowas
decided one term later, a new type of protectionist philosophy was
in evidence in the plurality opinion.
Were Mr. Justice Stewart's brief concurring opinion, which
found the challenged statutes simply to be invidiously discriminatory, less enigmatic, Frontiero would be a landmark decision. If
one were able to conclude that he found the statutes resulted in
an "invidious discrimination" as the consequence of Congress' use
of a suspect statutory classification, then a majority of the Court
would be on record as putting sex in the suspect category. But
if Justice Stewart's use of "invidious" was not meant to indicate the
suspect nature of the category, then Frontiero leaves eight members
of the Court finding a violation of due process under the fifth
amendment, four of them agreeing that sex is a suspect classification,
but five justices, including the dissenting Justice Rehnquist, disagreeing. To find a possible majority position for the Court on this
issue, an understanding of Justice Stewart's opinion is of central importance.
In relying solely on Reed, Justice Stewart may have accepted
the active-review approach taken in that case. On the other hand,
the word "invidious" combined with the citation to Reed could
mean more than an adoption of active review, for Justice Stewart
71368 U.S. 57 (1961).
72 Id. at 62.
73 404 U.S. at 77.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 824

has used that term in describing discrimination on the basis of race.74
However, he has recently defined the term in a case not involving
a fundamental right or a suspect classification. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez7 he stated: "[it has long
been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by
laws that are invidiously discriminatory - only by classifications
'"
that are wholly arbitrary or capricious. 76
It is more likely therefore that in using the word "invidious" in Frontiero Justice Stewart
was referring to arbitrary discrimination as in Reed77 and was not
using the term as shorthand for finding a suspect classification.
When this factor is added to the fact that he did not join in Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion, it seems clear that one cannot confidently ally Justice Stewart with the plurality.
In that case, however, the question remains why he did not join
Justice Powell's concurring opinion. A possible explanation for his
not doing so is that he may not have agreed with Justice Powell
that the Court should reserve a far-reaching women's rights decision
pending ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment."
But since
74 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964): "And I think it is simply not
possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality
of the act depend upon the race of the actor. Discrimination of that kind is invidious
per se."

Id. at 198.

75411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76 Id. at 60.
77 See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966), in which Justice Stewart
in writing the opinion of the Court concluded that a New Jersey statute requiring
persons imprisoned for a crime to repay the cost of an appeals transcript while placing
no such burden on others who were convicted yet not imprisoned, lacked any supportable rational basis (therefore was arbitrary) and was an "invidious discrimination."
If invidious means arbitrary, as Justice Stewart suggests, and arbitrary discrimination violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment, then the same standard
presumably could trigger a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such a definition of invidious would thus seem to make the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment superfluous. But arguably the issue of standing
is different under the due process and the equal protection clauses. The fourteenth
amendment states: "[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law." Thus, there must be a sufficient interest in liberty
or property to trigger the amendment's due process guarantees. Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599
(1972). The wording of the equal protection clause seems to require no such showing
to allege a denial of equal protection.
78 The BRA provides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
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Justice Powell asserted that there was no need to create a suspect
classification when Reed presented an adequate basis for granting
relief, apart from his deference to the pending ERA, his position
and that of Justice Stewart cannot be distinguished.
The future posture of the Court with respect to sex classification
is open. Possibly the split of opinions in Frontiero will reoccur.
But there are also conflicting signs of where the Court presently
stands on its use of the Reed approach to judicial review of equal
protection challenges. In its decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v.Rodriguez, 9 the Court appeared to abandon its
"spectrum of standards" 80 and to return to the two traditional tests,
the rational-basis test and the compelling-interest test. In Rodriguez, where the issue was whether the Texas system of school financing violated the equal protection clause, the Court spoke only
S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc 9598 (1972); H.R.J. Res. 208,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971). The states have until March
22, 1979, to complete the ratification of the amendment.
The pending ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment was considered a significant factor by both Justices Powell and Brennan in reaching their conclusions. Justice Brennan saw Congress' passage of the amendment as a decision on their part
"that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious." 411 U.S. at 687. To
him this was "not without significance" in coming to his finding that sex is a suspect
classification. Justice Powell, on the other hand, viewed the plurality's action not
as a reinforcement of Congress' decision but as an infringement on the legislative
prerogative of the states. Id. at 692. Both these views on the significance of pending
legislation have found expression in prior cases decided by the Court. Justice Brennan's approach is similar to the Court's approach in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966), where the Court accepted Congress' statutory definition of petty
offense in determining the applicability of the constitutional requirement of jury trial
to criminal contempt proceedings.
Justice Powell's hesitance "to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision
which is currently in process of resolution [through the legislative process]," 411
U.S. at 692, is similar to positions that have been taken by other members of the
Court. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), where the
Court held that certain housing practices were within the reach of the broadly phrased
prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented on the ground that Congress had enacted a detailed and comprehensive fairhousing statute to deal with the sorts of discriminations alleged. 396
U.S. at 247-51; cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 450 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting; writ of certiorari should be dismissed because recent congressional legislation had rendered the Court's decision of insufficient public importance). For a
discussion of other issues on which Mr. Justice Powell's views are similar to those
of the late Justice Harlan, see Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing
Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L REV. 1001 (1972). Another aspect
to Justice Powell's willingness to defer to legislative action is that the problem of
delineating impermissible sex discrimination will require considerable line drawing,
see text accompanying note 59 supra, which has traditionally been a function better
suited for legislatures than for courts. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 317
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
79 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
80 Id.at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in terms of the two traditional approaches to equal protection. After rejecting the arguments that the poor are a suspect classification 8
and that education is a fundamental right,8 2 it concluded that the
rational-basis test was therefore applicable.t
It did not consider
a balancing or active-review approach, though it acknowledged that
education is an important societal and judicial concern.'
Justice
Marshall, dissenting, strongly took issue with what he termed "the
Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis" and stated
that a "principled reading of what [thel Court has done (in prior
cases] reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards."8
Despite Rodriguez, Frontiero indicates that the hybrid approach
used in Reed is not dead. Justices Powell and Blackmun and the
Chief Justice all joined in the opinion of the Court in Rodriguez.
But less than 3 months after Rodriguez they again used the hybrid
approach in their .concurring opinion in Frontiero by relying on
Reed. 86 More recently, in Vlandis v. Kline8 the Court appeared
to be using the Reed approach to resolve a challenge to a legislative
classification under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The Court there struck down a Connecticut statute creating
an irrebutable presumption that persons who were nonresidents at
the time of application to a state university would be so for the
remainder of their enrollment. The Court explored and rejected
each of the three justifications given by the state89 in support of
the statute and proceeded to speculate on other less onerous methods
of accomplishing the state's objectives. The usual presumption of
validity of the legislative enactment was not present in Vlandis. As
in Reed, the state had to prove the actual rational basis for the
legislation; its offers met with thorough scrutiny and were rejected.
Based on the Court's recent behavior, notwithstanding its resort
81 Id. at 18.
82 Id. at 29-39.
83 Id. at 55. Elsewhere in Rodriguez the Court viewed Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), as a case where the law failed to satisfy "the more lenient equal
protection standard." 411 U.S. at 34, n.73. Yet this case is cited by commentators
as an archetype of active review. See note 40 supra.
84411 U.S. at 29-30. See note 43 supra.
85 Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
86 See text following note 45 supra.
87 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
88 Vlandis is a due process case, but the Court in some situations uses the same
analysis or tests when it is hearing a claim of deprivation of due process as it does
when denial of equal protection is alleged. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring). See also note 90 infra.
89412 U.S. at 448-51.
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to the strict two-tiered approach in Rodriguez, it is likely that the
Reed active-review approach will continue to be important? 0 In
the area of sex discrimination, the plurality's opinion in Frontiero
suggests that the Court will continue the evolution begun in Reed
of treating sex as a class to be afforded judicial protection." Taken
together Reed and Frontiero indicate that a majority of the Court
would now subscribe to the proposition that a state's interest in enhancing administrative convenience through the avoidance of caseby-case hearings upon the existence of particular attributes does not
justify the use of presumptions, whether conclusive or rebuttable,
that are based on sexual stereotypes92 - at least, so long as the
hearings can reasonably be conducted.93 This is true regardless of
whether the stereotypes have some basis in fact,94 and regardless
90 [It is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my Brother
MARSHALL has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.' San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 [1973]
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
Sometimes we just say the claim is 'invidious'
and let the matter rest there, as MR. JusTicE STEWART did, for example, in
concurring in the judgment in Frontiero. But at other times we sustain the
discrimination, if it is justifiable on any conceivable rational basis, or strike
it down, unless sustained by some compelling interest of the State ....
I am
uncomfortable with the dichotomy, for it must now be obvious, or has been
all along, that, as the Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be suficient to
justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations.
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
91
Frontiero has already had an effect on lower court decisions. In Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), the district court found the Louisiana
state law excusing women from jury service unless they elected to serve denied equal
protection to women who have suks pending in courts of the state and denied due
process to all litigants in the state courts. As an explanation for its departure from
the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the district
court said: "'This Court, of course, must follow the Supreme Court, but there are occasional situations in which subsequent Supreme Court opinions [Reed and Frontiero]
have so eroded an older case, without explicitly overruling it, as to warrant a subordinate court in pursuing what it conceives to be a clearly defined new lead from the
Supreme Court to a conclusion inconsistent with an older Supreme Court case.'" 363
F. Supp. at 1117, quoting Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cit. 1967),
aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
9 But see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 42, at 123-24.
93 But see text preceding note 98 infra.
94 In this respect, Frontiero might pose a significant step beyond Reed. In Reed,
it could be argued that the legislature's implicit conclusion that men were generally
better qualified to administer estates than women was purely speculative. Although
men might be more likely to have business careers, women, by virtue of their experience in administering personal or family finances, might be equally or better qualified.
In the Frontiero situation, on the other hand, there existed facts from which Congress
could reasonably infer that the average serviceman's wife is more likely to be dependent on her spouse than is the average servicewoman's husband. For example, while
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of whether using the scheme as a substitute for case-by-case hearings
affords significant administrative convenience.
The question remaining after Reed and Frontiero is in what
situations, if any, will classifications based upon sexual stereotypes
be allowed? The only possibility where the administrative convenience rationale might be sufficient to justify the discrimination
would be where the presence of the qualities or attributes that underlay the legislature's decision to classify by sex are not easily proven and therefore requiring the state to conduct case-by-case hearings
would be excessively onerous. For example, suppose a state permits
females to marry without parental consent after attaining age 18,
but requires males to be 21.11 This distinction might be supportable as an embodiment of the state's legitimate interest in assuring
that those who marry without parental consent are of sufficent mental and emotional maturity. In view of the burden to the state
of conducting case-by-case hearings on the issue of maturity for marriage, the state could argue that its interest in assuring maturity
coupled with its interest in adminstrative efficiency permitted its use
of presumptions based upon age, presumptions which, because adolescent women generally mature more rapidly than adolescent
men, distinguished between the sexes."6 The state could attempt
to distinguish Frontiero, where it would have been relatively
easy to determine dependency on a case-by-case basis,9 7 by asserting
that because the issue of maturity sufficient for marriage is a complex one, and a conclusive presumption of different maturity levels
might be an acceptable means of accomplishing the legislative goal.
This argument probably must be rejected in view of Reed, however,
where the issue whether an individual was the most competent person to administer an estate was similarly, though perhaps less, com-

85.5 percent of all married men are employed, only 41.5 percent of all married
women are. Moreover, in 63.0 percent of the households headed by a married couple,
only the husband is employed. In only 1.3 percent of the households is the wife
the only wage earner. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 164, 167 (1973).
95 Forty states and the District of Columbia presently fix different ages for males
and females to marry without parental consent. Friedrich v. Katz, 73 Misc. 2d 663,
664, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
96 See Brown, supra note 1, at 938-39.
97 To prove dependency all that was required of the servicewoman was the submission of an affidavit stating the income and personal expenses of her spouse. One
source has estimated the processing cost of each affidavit at $5. The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, supra note 42, at 122 nn.37, 39.
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plex, and the Court nonetheless branded the statute as arbitrary and
required the probate courts to hold hearings on the issue.98
The preceding discussion suggests that a state's interest in administrative convenience will rarely if ever be sufficient to permit
the use of a classification scheme based upon sexual stereotypes. But
conceivably, presumptions based upon sex might still be permissible
in situations where no individual hearing on the attributes is possible. Examples are the statutory rape laws which punish men for
having sexual intercourse with women under a specified age. Although a legislature's decision to extend protection to females only
could be supported by its conclusion that young women are more
likely than young men to engage in early consensual sexual intercourse, and more likely to suffer serious emotional harm as a consequence, 9 this scheme is no less a sexual stereotype than the statutes
involved in Reed and Frontiero. But because the state's criminal
prohibitions must be comprised of unambiguous and readily ascertainable elements, and there is no opportunity for the state to conduct a hearing to determine whether a potential victim in fact needs
the protection the legislation is intended to give, the sexual stereotype in this case is probably allowable even after Frontiero, as the
only reasonable means of attaining the legislative goal.
Under the ERA, however, even the discrimination in the preceding hypothetical would not be permitted."
Also, if the ERA
is adopted, the use of "benign" legislation by the state,101 permitted
under Reed and Frontiero so long as the means are reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective,"0 2 may no longer be allowable.4 3 Much of this gap between the coverage of the active-review
98
.A challenge to a similar New York statute was recently made by an 18-yearold male. In a decision written after Reed but before Frontiero the court determined
the statute did not unconstitutionally discriminate against males under the age of
21. Using a traditional rational basis test, the court found that the state had a
legitimate interest in the marriage relation and that the conceivable fact that the
male will be the provider in the usual marriage relationship "is sufficient reason
to require males to be older and generally more suited to their duty before they
may independently decide to marry." Friedrich v. Katz, 731 Misc. 2d 663, 66465, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The case is currently being appealed.
99 See Brown, supra note 1, at 957-58.

100 Id.
101See generally Developments, supra note 25, at 1072-75, 1104-17. Legislation
which singles out individual race or ethnic minority groups to redress the effects
of past discrimination by giving special treatment to those groups is known as benign.
Id. at 1104-05.
20 2 See text accompanying notes 111-12 infra.
10 3 See Brown, supra note 1, at 903-05. But as to benign discrimination through

federal legislation see text accompanying notes 110-14 infra.
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doctrine and that of the ERA would be overcome if, through a
liberal reading of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion,'10 4 a majority of the
Frontiero Court could be viewed as deeming sex to be a suspect
classification. Still, the protection provided by the ERA is more
secure than that resulting from a judicial decision, which may subsequently be overruled. And even if sex were considered a suspect
classification, the fifth and fourteenth amendments might not afford
the same protection promised by the ERA. 10 5 The Court has recognized a compelling interest great enough to overcome the suspect
nature of a legislative classification based on national origin.'
In
contrast, since Brown v. Board of Education,"7 the Court has not
found an interest compelling enough to justify the use of racially
based classifications. A principal reason is that in the background
of the racial discrimination cases is a judicial recognition that the
purpose of the fourteenth as well as the thirteenth and fifteenth
amendments was the protection of the black race.' 8 This distinction at least suggests that judicial imposition of suspect classification
treatment, by itself, will not provide the same protection as an
amendment explicitly passed to end state sanctioned sex discrimination. 09
An additional advantage under the proposed amendment could
come from its second section: "The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
This is verbatim the wording of section 5 of the fourteenth amend104 See note 74 supra and accompanying text.

105 Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HAv. Crv. RiGHTsCIV. LIB. L. REV. 225, 228-31 (1971).
106 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Recently, the Court in
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), stated: "We did not decide in Graham Ev.
Richardson] nor do we decide here whether special circumstances, such as armed
hostilities between the United States and the country of which the alien is a citizen,
would justify the use of a classification based on alienage." Id. at 722 n.11.
107 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
109 Various other reasons are given why a constitutional amendment is preferable
to the protection the Court can grant by finding sex to be a suspect classification.
An amendment would insulate the Court from criticism that it was legislating, would
have a greater political and psychological impact, and would have effects on the status
of women beyond the legal system. Brown, supra note 1, at 884-85.
Opponents of the ERA argue that the fifth and the fourteenth amendments provide
adequate protection. They rely on the fact that although the primary purpose of the
fourteenth amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination, the protection of the
amendment has been extended to lineage and alienage. This argument assumes, of
course, that in time the Court will consider sex a suspect classification. Note, supra
note 46, at 1507. See also S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1972)
(minority views of Senator Ervin).
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ment. Its significance lies in the power it gives Congress to effectuate the goals of the amendment through benign legislation.11 From
the Court's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan,:" it has been suggested that legislation extending a preference to a group discriminated against in the past might not be struck down for using a
discriminatory classification if it is viewed as benign. 12 In such
a case, the legislation might only have to undergo the traditional
rational basis standard of review. But there is some indication in
Oregon v. Mitchell" 3 that the power of Congress to take these remedial steps is limited to matters of racial discrimination, where Congress has passed a law to enable a racial minority to resist violations
of the fourteenth amendment." 4 This limitation is apparently a
function of the fourteenth amendment's basic purpose to assure
equal protection of the laws to the black race. Similarly, the enforcement section of the equal rights amendment, designed specifically to assure equality of rights between the sexes, should give Congress the power to take positive steps toward equalizing the position
of women relative to that of men in areas of American life where
government has a legitimate presence.
LESLIE DOLIN WIESENBERGER
110 Absent the enforcement clause, the ERA would probably preclude the use of
all benign legislation. Brown, supra note 1, at 903-05. With the clause, Congress
is permitted to act, but the states continue to be precluded. See text accompanying
notes 101-03 supra.
11384 U.S. 641 (1966).
112 Developments,supra note 25, at 1109-10.
13400

U.S. 112 (1970).

Id. at 126-31. See also Note, supra note 46, 1517-18. Cf. Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Mancari v. Morton, 359 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.M. 1973).
14

